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Abstract 
This article analyzes the role of Turkey in the European Union’s energy security and its implica-
tions for the Turkish accession process. The EU is increasingly interested in diversifying its im-
ports of energy, as well as the transit routes for these imported supplies.  Extant and future pro-
jects to secure energy supplies from Russia, the Caspian and the Middle East indicate quite per-
suasively that Turkey has become more crucial to the attainment of the EU external energy policy 
objectives. However, Turkey may have reached the limits of its willingness to cooperate on ener-
gy security without more decisive EU reciprocation of Turkey’s own EU membership efforts. In 
the short run, Turkey is not essential to the EU, but in the longer run, as European energy needs 
become more pressing, the EU may have to give more serious consideration to Turkey’s acces-
sion.   
   1 
Policymakers in EU countries and institutions have grown increasingly concerned with 
energy security. The Russian state-run Gazprom monopoly’s gas cutoff to Ukraine on December 
31, 2005, pushed energy to the forefront of the Union’s foreign policy agenda. The Commission’s 
March 2006 Green Paper underscored that “security against political risks including interruption 
of supply is critical to predictability” (European Commission 2006a: 8). A major oil cutoff by 
Russia’s monopoly Transneft pipeline operator to transit country Belarus in January 2007 fur-
nished an analogous backdrop to the issuance of a proposed Energy Policy for Europe (Euro-
pean Commission 2007a). The unresolved Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute triggered a weeks-long 
Gazprom cut three years to the day after the earlier crisis, revealing numerous EU states’ linger-
ing vulnerability to winter energy shortages, and prompting the European Union Council (2009: 
2) to call for intensified efforts to diversify energy suppliers, sources and routes.  
 
Thus, while the  EU’s conception of the objective of energy security includes  demand 
management and environmental goals, secure access to supplies has become a core motif. The 
EU has thus far avoided taking the path of the U.S. government, whose experience in Iraq re-
vealed the difficulty of applying military tools to obtain oil (Williams 2006: 1078-1080). Nonethe-
less, European officials, having grown more aware of the merits of adopting a strategic approach 
to energy, view trans-Turkey pipelines as crucial levers in this regard (Tekin & Walterova 2007). 
Indeed, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, who has advocated it as “essential to Europe 
and the EU’s most important gas supply project” (Socor 2006d), signed an intergovernmental ac-
cord supporting the €8-10 billion, 3,400-kilometer Nabucco Pipeline. This project, by joining its 
main trunk to separate branches carrying gas from Egypt, Iran and Iraq, would eventually con-
nect Turkmenistan’s Caspian littoral to Austria’s Baumgarten gas hub and transform Turkey in-
to a conduit for up to thirty-one billion cubic meters (bcm) of non-Russian gas supplies to Eu-
rope. The European  Commission (2007a: 9) has  called for a  European  coordinator to pursue 
Nabucco as part of the EU’s Priority Interconnection Plan, while the EU Council (2009: 2) has 
emphasized the need for a “Southern gas corridor” based on wider access to Caspian energy. 
 
Nabucco has not been free of problems. Pricing disputes between Turkey and its five EU-
country consortium partners, financing issues and increasing receptivity to using Russian gas, 
which  Gazprom  has  proposed  sending  through  its  rival  South  Stream  Project  (Baran  2008; 
Yinanc 2009), have cast doubt on its practicality and even rationale. Still, high-level EU officials, 
notably including Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who stated in January 2009 that 
energy security “is one of the cases where we can show to the European Union public opinion 
how  important  Turkey  is  for  the  EU”  (Vucheva  2009),  have  implicitly  endorsed  the  linkage 
drawn by Turkish officials between cooperation on Nabucco and progress on accession, even the 
energy chapter of which has been blocked by Cyprus, a member state that has clashed with Tur-
key over offshore oil exploration (Geropoulos 2008). 
 
Turkish policymakers have made a clearer connection between Turkey’s service as an en-
ergy corridor and the accession process. For example, in 2007, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
argued that “Turkey’s membership perspective and the ongoing accession negotiations with the 
EU will be a driving force for the realization of joint projects which will enhance the supply 
security of Turkey and the EU.”
1 Obviously, it is tempting for the Turkish side to play the ener-
gy card in hopes of ensuring that the EU appreciates Turkey’s strategic value. Turkish policy-
makers consider that the US government has been more attentive to highlighting the signifi-
                                                 
1Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU: Together for a European Energy Policy—High Level Conference 
in Istanbul on June 5, 2007.   2 
cance of Turkey for the energy security of Europe than the EU itself, as the former often urges 
the Europeans to diversify gas supplies away from Russia (Tekin 2005; Tekin & Walterova 2007). 
Katinka Barysch (2007) has aptly pointed out that EU member states remain too captive to short-
term electoral pressures to be capable of advocating long-term strategic objectives on the issue of 
enlargement, thus preventing them from acting more decisively on Turkish accession. 
 
We concur that, from an energy security angle, it is becoming increasingly imprudent for 
the EU to equivocate on Turkey’s accession. The physical basis for a more expansive yet closely 
integrated European energy network, transnational pipeline infrastructure presupposes a “pre-
dictable  economic  and  political  context  for  investors  to  sink  their  capital  and  knowledge” 
(Barnes et al. 2006: 4). A requisite degree of stability entails coordination of a large array of ac-
tors as well as  complex financial, regulatory, physical and political arrangements, consonant 
with EU-governed “common regulatory space” or “pan-European energy Community” (Euro-
pean Commission 2006a: 16). Any trans-European energy network will be relatively more diffi-
cult to extend to major producer Russia and transit countries Belarus and Ukraine than to Tur-
key, which offers not only the crucial additional advantage of diversifying suppliers, but also a 
demonstrable willingness to comply with EU regulations, notably the Council’s 2003 gas market 
directive (World Bank 2006: 70-72). 
 
EU officials’ cognizance of Turkey’s crucial role in energy transit will not automatically 
lower many member states’ entrenched resistance to Turkish membership. Other modes of colla-
boration with Turkey could suffice to improve Europe’s energy security, especially if Turkey be-
comes  a  contracting  party  to  the  Energy  Community  of  Southeast  Europe,  which  mandates 
adoption of the gas acquis, comprising not only the 2003 directive, but also the EU Council’s 2004 
gas security directive to coordinate emergency use of storage facilities and its 2005 regulation on 
opening transmission network access. Accordingly, as Turkey remains reluctant to adopt the gas 
acquis fully, the EU can neither guarantee the application of common standards and mechanisms 
for rapid reaction to supply disruptions and physical attacks on infrastructure (European Com-
mission  2006a:  8)  nor  constrain  Gazprom,  which  commands  the  single  largest  share  of  the 
world’s gas reserves, from extending its operational sway over Turkey’s (and other newer EU 
members’) gas systems (Roberts 2006: 219). 
 
As EU politicians have usually avoided making boldly explicit claims about the role of 
Turkey’s energy card in accession negotiations, the validity of any such claims is by no means 
obvious. It relies on certain assumptions discussed below. One is that EU economies require di-
versification of energy suppliers. The second is that the EU needs to be able to exert more direct 
influence over the latter. More specific premises are that Turkey is a relatively cost-effective 
route for transporting diversified EU energy supplies and that Turkey’s EU membership will en-
hance EU influence over a wider range of energy-providing regions.  
    
The EU and Energy Security  
 
The EU has admittedly low chances of obtaining energy self-sufficiency. EEA oil reserves 
are declining due the maturity of fields in the North Sea, still a major indigenous source of gas. 
Four-fifths of Europe’s fossil fuel reserves comprise solid fuel, yet, ironically for an organization 
that originated in the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), extraction of coal in Eu-
rope now costs three to four times the world average, leading major EU-15 economies to de-
crease mining activity (European Commission 2001: 19-20). Moreover, the European Commis-
sion recognizes that maintaining the one-third share of Europe’s electricity output that is gen-
erated by coal, a major contributor to CO2 emissions, mandates commercialization of carbon se-  3 
questration and clean coal technologies (European Commission 2006a: 9). More than one-third 
of the Union’s electricity and 15 percent of its overall energy are supplied by nuclear power, but 
expanding its use has yet to overcome the opposing concerns of many EU citizens about waste 
disposal and safety (European Commission 2007a: 17-18). Use of renewable resources averages 6 
percent across EU member states, a rate that may double by 2010 and treble by 2020. While the 
latter target encompasses a 10 percent biofuel mix in all transportation fuels, even this seemingly 
reasonable goal is unlikely to be reached (European Commission 2007a: 13-15). 
 
Thus, the EU’s need for external fuel sources is set to rise. The twenty-seven member 
states import half of their collective natural gas and oil requirements and will probably rely on 
imports to meet over 80 and 90 percent of their collective natural gas and oil needs, respectively, 
in the next two decades (European Commission 2007a: 3). Although emphasizing the impor-
tance of greater efficiency in energy usage, the European Commission (2001: 29-30) acknowl-
edges the practical difficulty of decreasing EU reliance on imports. Therefore, the EU faces an in-
creasingly urgent need to develop new policies in order to ensure the most propitious terms of 
access to diverse energy sources and suppliers.  
 
EU Leverage on Energy Producing Regions 
 
Heavy EU reliance on oil and gas imports is exacerbated by the nature and limited num-
ber of its source regions. As the Union purchases 40 percent of its gas imports from Russia, and 
a slightly larger fraction of its imported oil from Middle Eastern OPEC states, it makes sense for 
the EU to diversify its supply sources (European Commission 2001: 2). Nonetheless, while advo-
cating greater diversification of energy sources and suppliers, the European Commission (2001: 
22-23) understands that the present profile of EU hydrocarbon dependence on Russia, the Cas-
pian, the Middle East and North Africa is unlikely to shift markedly. While gas imports from 
EEA member Norway occur largely within the scope of the EU regulations, those from Russia 
and Algeria do not. As the EU energy market liberalizes under EC pressure on national authori-
ties to “unbundle” ownership of energy production from that of distribution, Russia’s Gazprom 
has been endeavoring not only to expand trunk pipeline capacity, but also to acquire command-
ing shares, via marketing intermediaries, of local storage nodes and distribution channels within 
the European Union, as in numerous FSU countries (Socor 2006a; Woehrel 2007: 7-13). These ef-
forts aim to capture monopoly rents created by large differentials between low production costs 
and high retail prices (Victor & Victor 2006, pp. 138-139).  
 
Dependent on a limited range of sources and suppliers, the EU continues to bear the risk 
of cuts, even those that occur as by-products of producer-transit country disputes. This risk first 
manifested itself on December 31, 2005, when Gazprom shut off gas to Ukraine, which in turn 
diverted  deliveries  in  the  TransGas  pipeline  from  European  to  domestic  customers  (Chivers 
2006).
2 The following winter, Transneft, the state-run monopoly operator of oil pipelines cross-
ing Russian territory, stopped the flow of Russian oil exports to Europe via Belarus due to a 
                                                 
2Alternative accounts of the Ukrainian cutoff focus not only on the upsurge in Russian demand during an 
unusually cold winter, which might be considered a proximate cause, but also on a number of interrelated 
background  factors.  These  include  heavily  subsidized  domestic  gas  prices  relative  to  European  retail 
prices (hence, leaving customers with little incentive to conserve), Gazprom’s heavy acquisition of non-
core assets, part of a political strategy that has left it highly indebted, and Russia’s largely self-imposed 
difficulty in attracting foreign investment into the upstream sector. Thus, it appears logical for Gazprom 
to seek higher retail prices or larger shares of distribution networks in Ukraine and other subsidized ex-
port markets (Johnson 2005: 269-271; Victor 2006; Victor & Victor 2006: 139-141).   4 
trade dispute involving a similar act of siphoning by the latter (Myers 2007). In March 2008, 
Gazprom halved deliveries to Ukraine over the latter’s unpaid gas bills and Ukrainian officials 
threatened to cut shipments to EU customers (White 2008). The latest cutoff to Ukraine started 
on the last day of 2008 and lasted nearly three weeks, the last two of which involved Gazprom’s 
retaliation against Ukraine’s diversions by ceasing supplies to dedicated transit pipelines, lead-
ing to severe shortfalls through Europe and Turkey. While Ukraine agreed to host independent 
gas-flow  monitors  during  the  crisis  (Castle  and  Kramer  2009),  the  EU  has  limited  counter-
leverage over key producing and transit regions.
3 
 
Turkey’s Role in Extending EU Leverage on Energy Suppliers 
 
Conversely, Turkey may allow the EU not only greater geographical propinquity to, but 
also more direct political influence over, the Caspian Basin and Russia, as well as a bridge to the 
hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf. This latter role would serve to complement Europe’s presently 
more favorable terms of access to North African energy sources. Turkey lies near regions with 
over 70 percent of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves (Roberts 2004: 1). The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (2006: 9) has estimated that Turkey may host 6-7 percent of 
global oil transport by 2012. Nonetheless, although Turkey’s role as an oil-transit country is im-
portant for regional exporters, it is less vital for global importers, including EU states, because of 
oil’s greater fungibility (Roberts 2004: 19). Conversely, states in producing regions holding over 
one-third of gas reserves have expressed varying degrees of interest in using Turkey as a transit 
country to the EU (Roberts 2004: 1). 
 
External Source Regions for EU Energy—Russia  
 
EU countries (in terms of diversifying their supply routes) and Russia could facilitate the 
transit of more Russian gas via Turkey, although the Union has a greater necessity for this than 
Russia. Gazprom, for example, already supplies most of the natural gas consumed in EU coun-
tries Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Slovakia (BP 2007: 27, 30). This dominant market position reinforces a situation where up-
stream sections of Russia’s energy sector remain precariously open to competition, but oil and 
gas export pipelines fall under the monopoly control, respectively, of state-run operators Trans-
neft and Gazprom. Moreover, the latter firm is best poised to preclude rival, especially Caspian, 
suppliers’ use (see below) of Turkey as an independent transit route (Roberts 2006: 219). 
 
Thus, Gazprom does not oppose enlisting Turkey as a transit route for its own gas if it 
can extend effective control over the bulk of future deliveries along that route. Emboldened by 
its hosting of the BTC/BTE infrastructure, Ankara has some capacity to resist becoming another 
Russian-dominated transit corridor, as reflected in its seeking of rights to re-export Turkey’s un-
used fraction of Russian (and Iranian) gas imports to EU states, as well as in its related suspen-
sions of gas imports contracted for on a “take-or-pay” basis (Winrow 2004: 29-30). On the other 
hand, Turkey’s ability to act against Gazprom’s interests appears heavily constrained by its own 
dependence on that company for almost two-thirds of its own gas consumption and by Russia’s 
access to a larger number of non-Turkish routes to its EU market. For example, Gazprom has 
been backing the 30-bcm-capacity “South Stream” pipeline, which is to transit the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria and onwards to Greece and Italy (Eni is Gazprom’s project partner) via one branch and 
                                                 
3Other than re-emphasizing measures to increase storage and coordinate uses of it pursuant to the 2004 
gas security directive, EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs has also advocated efforts to assist Ukraine in 
making its transit grid more efficient (Hall 2009a, 2009b).    5 
to Serbia, Hungary and Austria via a second branch (Baran 2008); however, the appeal of this 
route may be tempered by its likely passage through Ukraine’s offshore territory.
4 
 
Yet, Gazprom has also sought to augment the capacity of Turkey’s gas pipeline infra-
structure to serve European markets. The “Blue Stream” pipeline, operational since 2003 and ca-
pable of piping up to 16 bcm of Russian gas to Turkey, could be expanded (in a second phase) to 
act  as  a  Southern  complement  to  the  Northern  European  Gas  Pipeline,  known  as  “Nord 
Stream.” The latter Russo-German project is to link Russia’s Yamal Peninsula fields via the Baltic 
Sea  to  Germany  and  elsewhere  in  Europe,  circumventing  Ukraine,  Poland  and  EU  member 
states of the Baltic Sea region and thus raising concomitant security-related issues for EU mem-
ber states (Belkin 2007: 4; Larsson 2007). In short, “Blue Stream II” envisages converting Turkish 
pipelines into a Gazprom conduit to Europe via Greece, thus coopting the Southern corridor to 
bar independent transport of Caspian gas (Kramer 2005). Relatedly, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller 
even offered to invest in expanding the capacity of the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (see be-
low) and  guarantee affiliated Russian  gas  supplies (Torbakov 2006b). Indeed,  Russo-Turkish 
projects have been associated with Gazprom’s corrupting influence on EU member and candi-
date countries (Winrow 2003), as well as its broader strategy of creating gas trading companies 
with opaque structures of ownership in Europe, acquiring transit lines and buying into local dis-
tribution outfits (Roberts 2006: 219) 
 
The EU has also been engaged in dialogue with Russia. To some, Russia’s interest in co-
operation is motivated by Gazprom’s highly subsidized domestic gas prices, which deprive it of 
investment capital for new fields and make it more reliant on the Euro-Turkish retail markets 
(Darley 2004: 104; Roberts 2006: 220-221; Victor & Victor 2006: 139-141). The EU would like to 
maintain access to Russia’s upstream energy sector and obtain Moscow’s ratification of the WTO-
compatible Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its Transit Protocol (i.e., in order to obtain non-
Russian Caspian gas), while the Kremlin seeks WTO membership and greater latitude for Gaz-
prom to buy into Europe’s downstream gas networks. To this end, it has allowed selective West-
ern multinational access to Russia’s energy reserves (especially the offshore Sakhalin Island and 
Shtokman gas fields, slated for liquefied natural gas [LNG] exports), while periodically threat-
ening Europe with larger LNG and piped-gas exports to East Asia and elsewhere (Baev 2006; 
Romero 2006; Torbakov 2006a). The Kremlin has also maintained control over use of the only in-
dependent  trans-Russia  conduit  with  foreign  corporate  participation—the  Caspian  Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) pipeline carrying Tengiz (Kazakhstan) oil to the Russian port of Novorossiisk 
(Socor 2007b).
5 This suggests caution in increasing EU reliance on Russian gas and the need for a 
more active effort to ensure that Turkey’s pipeline network is capable, not merely physically, 
but also politically, of advancing the EU’s collective energy-security interest in diversification of 
routes and suppliers for those routes. In sum, the EU may have to move more decisively on 
Turkey’s accession in order to bring Turkey’s energy transit infrastructure more securely under 
Union regulation. 
 
                                                 
4“Ukraine Surfaced in South Stream Project,” Kommersant International, February 29, 2008, available via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008. 
5Russia reportedly later allowed  CPC expansions only on the condition that Kazakhstan agree to parti-
cipate in the Transneft-led Bourgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline that is to link Russia to Bulgaria and Greece. 
See  “Russia:  The  Putin  Doctrine,”  Energy  Compass,  January  4,  2008,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008.   6 
The Caspian Region 
 
In diametric contrast to the EU’s situation vis-à-vis Russia, the EU has a more pressing 
need, not shared at all by Russia, for non-Russian FSU gas to cross Turkey. During the Cold War, 
the Caspian Basin was largely Soviet territory, yet left relatively undeveloped by Moscow. Even 
now, most export routes cross Russia. Clearly, the EU’s proclaimed policy of gas-supply diver-
sification opposes Gazprom’s dominant hold on gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan. As expressed in the 1994 ECT and related Transit Protocol, the EU seeks to loosen Gaz-
prom’s and Transneft’s respective chokeholds over the Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline 
and the various oil pipelines that terminate at Russia’s Black Sea and Baltic ports or cross direct-
ly into Europe (Olcott 2006: 222-226; Roberts 2006: 217-218; Belkin 2007: 3, 11). This chokehold 
may become even tighter if another planned Gazprom-dominated pipeline is built to carry ad-
ditional Turkmen and Kazakh gas northwards along the Caspian littoral into Russia.
6 Thus, the 
Union has had to pursue additional means of accessing Caspian energy. 
 
Earlier economic obstacles to the construction of non-Russian pipelines from the Caspian 
Basin were formidable. These stemmed both from the fact that pipelines controlled by Gazprom 
and Transneft were already built and thus enjoyed considerable cost advantages vis-à-vis pro-
posed alternatives (Roberts 2006, p. 220). They also related to the evident economic infeasibility, 
notably during the soft energy market of the 1990s, of building all of the desired “multiple pipe-
lines” comprising the centerpiece of Clinton-era U.S. government policy of fostering an East-
West energy corridor in post-Soviet space (Williams & Tekin 2008). Scepticism about the finan-
cial  viability of  non-Russian-controlled Caspian  pipeline infrastructure then  undergoing  con-
struction lingered even as late as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, widely anticipated 
to unleash a deluge of cheap hydrocarbon supplies (Andrianopoulos 2003: 80). However, by 
constricting that country’s energy output, internal violence in post-invasion Iraq helped to raise 
hydrocarbon prices (Williams 2007: 51) and bolster the economics of Caspian-based projects. 
This underscores the fact that high prices, while undesirable for consumers in the short term, 
support the entry of otherwise prohibitively expensive alternative sources and suppliers, lower-
ing prices in the long term (Fusaro 2002: 47-48; Maugeri 2006).  
 
Consequently, Russia’s former transportation stranglehold has been relaxed by newer 
projects that, despite over a decade of awkward progress, have finally been ushered into opera-
tion. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline now transports oil, in volumes projected to reach 
1.5 million barrels per day, from Azerbaijan’s offshore territory via Turkey for (mostly) Euro-
pean customers. In 2007,  its  parallel  Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, or South Caucasus 
Pipeline (SCP), began carrying natural gas in volumes that could eventually total 20 bcm (6.6 bcm 
for Turkey), offshore from Azerbaijan for shipment via Georgia to Turkey, from where it can be 
linked via the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (at present) or Nabucco (in the future) to various 
nodes of the European gas grid.
7 According to a bilateral agreement, Turkey can deliver or “on-
sell” Azerbaijani energy received through these pipelines to European markets, while it is con-
                                                 
6“Russia:  The  Putin  Doctrine,”  Energy  Compass,  January  4,  2008,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed March 10. 2008. 
7Opponents have not been idle bystanders to the progression of these key Turkish transit projects. Even 
after  they  were  already  operating,  their  lingering  vulnerability  was  highlighted  by  the  August  2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia and the PKK terrorist group’s sabotage of the BTC line, both of which influ-
enced BP’s decision to shut down the BTC and BTE lines and Russia’s offer to purchase Azerbaijan’s gas ex-
ports (Daly 2008).    7 
tractually prohibited from doing the same with Russian (via the Blue Stream project) and Iranian 
gas (Roberts 2004: 15-16). 
 
Greece and Turkey built a two-way pipeline interconnection between 2005 and 2007 able 
carry up to 12 bcm of (primarily Caspian) natural gas to Europe. Via extension, this line is ex-
pected to reach Italy and possibly Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria, members of the Energy 
Community (Winrow 2004: 32-33). The first leg of this larger South European Gas Ring germi-
nated under the aegis of the EU’s INOGATE program and received Commission funding for feasi-
bility studies (Winrow 2004: 36). Noting a distinct drawback of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU 
in this context, observers have remarked that Turkey has the right to mark up the price of Azer-
baijani gas going to Greece and Italy while forcing Greek and Italian purchasing companies, via 
intergovernmental agreement that permits Ankara to inspect the relevant contracts, to sell Tur-
key gas at the price paid to Azerbaijan.
8 
 
As European firms are prominent in the Caspian energy sector, they have a corollary in-
terest in ensuring the most competitive terms for their oil and gas exports. British Petroleum 
(BP)  leads the associated  BTC and Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oilfield  project consortia and 
shares the leadership, with Norway’s Statoil, of the complementary SCP and Shah Deniz gasfield 
projects. On the opposite side of the Caspian, Italy’s Eni-Agip and British Gas control most of 
Kazakhstan’s  Karachaganak  gas  output  and,  in  partnership  with  France’s  Total  and  Anglo-
Dutch firm Shell (as well as ExxonMobil), own a combined 75 percent share of that country’s 
Kashagan oil field, although state company KazMunaiGaz unilaterally bolstered its share to 18-
19 percent in 2007 to create an equal five-way division (Stern 2007). This oilfield could eventu-
ally supply—via tanker or undersea pipeline—the BTC pipeline, of which Total and Eni-Agip 
have a combined 10 percent stake. Total also has a 10 percent share in the SCP line, which could 
pipe Turkmen gas via a proposed Trans-Caspian line, estimated by Azeri officials to cost $5 bil-
lion and to be capable of carrying 30 bcm (Socor 2006b). 
 
Relative to the decisiveness with which Europe’s own private-sector actors aimed to tap 
gas supplies from the newly independent Caspian littoral states, EU member governments have, 
until more recently, shown a mixed attitude to Caspian energy. This ambivalence has stemmed 
from members’ heavy reliance on Russian gas, which has only reinforced the pursuit by some of 
their  companies,  with  official  backing,  of  separate  deals  with  Gazprom  (Belkin  2007:  9-13). 
Indeed, as the European Commission (2007a: 18-19) admits, EU members have visibly struggled 
to “speak with one voice” on common energy concerns. While Caspian gas would cover a small 
fraction of overall European imports, as the BTE line will convey only about 10-15 bcm per year 
of Azeri gas to Europe, a small volume compared to the EU’s projected future annual consump-
tion of 700 bcm (Roberts 2004: 2-3), it could hold gas prices down at the margins.
9 Moreover, if 
this gas finds an exit route via Turkey to EU markets, it could also strengthen Caspian states’ 
economic independence and stability (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2006: 
9). 
 
When it does address Caspian energy issues, the Union has tended to do so through 
broad-based initiatives, such as the largely defunct Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central 
Asia (TRACECA) and its current European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In parallel to a U.S. propo-
                                                 
8“Turkey,  Greece  Open  Gas  Link,”  Platt’s  International  Gas  Report,  December  3,  2007,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/aa/default.aspx, accessed March 10, 2008. 
9Steven  R.  Mann,  “Remarks:  Florence  IEA  Conference,”  April  14,  2003,  available  via 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2003/caspian/Mann.pdf, accessed  March 10, 2008.   8 
sal that NATO’s Article V mutual defense clause serve as a possible model for emergency sharing 
of Euro-Atlantic energy supplies (Belkin 2007: 27), the European Commission (2006a: 8) implies 
that tighter integration of Turkey into the EU could also bolster Community mechanisms for 
securing physical infrastructure from attack. This would complement Turkey’s potential role in 
augmenting total EU gas stocks that can be cooperatively stored and released in the event of 
supply  disruptions.  Although  Turkey’s  pronounced  vulnerability  to  these  attacks  militates 
against increased reliance on its pipeline network, the country has gained practical experience in 
responding to sabotage of the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline in January 1997 (Karagiannis 2002: 
98), the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline in August 2006 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2006), 
and the BTC line itself in August 2008 (Daly 2008). Indeed, the pipelines, albeit not the valves, 
along the  BTC/BTE route are buried, and Turkey has carried out joint military exercises with 
NATO “partners for peace” and BTC/BTE transit states Azerbaijan and Georgia, in addition to co-
operating with foreign forces in training to protect pipelines within its own territory (Luft 2004; 
Tigner 2006). By bringing the Caspian states physically and politically closer to the EU, Turkey’s 
accession could give the Union reciprocally greater and more multi-dimensional influence in the 
Caspian. 
 
The Middle East (and North Africa) 
 
With the world’s largest combined hydrocarbon reserves, the Middle East and North Af-
rica represent the least tractable areas for the Union (or any outside actor) to influence. First, due 
to a longer period of extractive activity associated with Western colonial dominance and geo-
graphical access to seaborne transportation routes, this region already has ample production 
and export infrastructure. Secondly, regional countries have exerted output and pricing power 
via asset nationalization, embargo and cartel action. As they did during the 1973-1974 Arab oil 
embargo (Skeet 1988: 118), and as they are now doing with Russia, European countries have 
adopted largely non-confrontational strategies in seeking to stabilize energy prices. Indeed, the 
European Commission (2001: 73) is attuned to the “expectations of several producer countries 
regarding political developments in the Middle East.” 
 
Like its European counterparts, Turkey has minimal influence over this region, although 
it has slightly more leverage on the gas issue, because of the continued prominence of Europe-
oriented transit pipelines, than in the oil sector. For the past thirty years, punctuated by several 
periods of stoppage, Iraq has been a major exporter of crude oil via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipe-
line that terminates in Ceyhan, Turkey. Post-occupation infrastructure sabotage in post-invasion 
Iraq had rendered the pipeline largely inoperable (Williams 2006: 1078) until late 2007.
10 This 
may also have imparted new impetus to a 1996 bilateral proposal to develop the annual capacity 
to pipe 10 bcm of gas from northern Iraq to Turkey (Roberts 2004, p. 7; Winrow 2004, p. 34).
11 
Qatar, the world’s second largest holder of gas reserves behind Russia, remains noncommittal 
on supplying trans-Turkey pipelines, partially because it is undertaking enormous projects to 
liquefy natural gas and export LNG by tanker. By 2030, given its relatively smaller population 
and larger share of an expanded LNG trade, this tiny kingdom could emerge as the “swing pro-
ducer,” affecting global supply and price levels at the critical margin in the area of natural gas 
(Jaffe & Soligo 2006: 459). 
 
                                                 
10 “Iraq Oil Min: Iraq Currently Producing 2.5 Mln B/D,” Dow Jones Commodities Service, March 5, 2008, 
available via http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008. 
11  “Turkey  and  Iraq  Agree  on  Trade  and  Energy,”  Turkish  Daily  News,  August  9,  2007,  available  via 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80469, accessed August 9, 2007.   9 
Iran, holding the world’s third largest reserves, could provide an alternative source of 
European gas. Iranian gas has been estimated as capable of meeting more than 10 percent of the 
Union’s  medium-term  needs  (European  Commission  2005:  15).  Given  that  most  Iranian  gas 
bound for Europe will flow through Turkey, bilateral Turco-Iranian disputes complicate the via-
bility of this transport route. Related to the underlying issue of Turkey’s over-buying of im-
ported gas supplies on a “take-or-pay” basis, which also applies to Russia, Turkish authorities 
ceased Iranian imports in early 2003, just weeks after the 10 bcm-capacity Tabriz-Erzurum pipe-
line commenced operations, in an attempt to force changes in the terms of trade (Winrow 2004: 
29-30). Iran itself has stopped the flow of gas into this conduit, ostensibly to cover domestic 
shortages, in recent winters, a situation exacerbated by an early 2008 decrease in the flow from 
Turkmenistan to  Iran that in turn caused a  reduction  in gas flow to the recently  completed 
Turkey-Greece Interconnector.
12 Reflecting the amicability of Russo-Iranian relations, Gazprom 
has announced its intentions to invest in the South Pars gasfield. This has uncertain implications 
for Nabucco, although these plans are more likely motivated by the desire to strengthen Gaz-
prom’s weak position in the LNG market.
13 On the other hand, although the EU seems to have 
become less receptive to importing energy from Iran over the stalemated nuclear issue, the lat-
ter’s energy firms, holding 10-percent shares of both the BTE pipeline and its feeder Shah Deniz 
gas, have an interest in the Southern energy corridor. 
 
By the same token, Iran also has an interest in facilitating Nabucco. The project, however, 
has run into unforeseen difficulties. First, Hungary’s MOL energy firm, one of six Nabucco con-
sortium partners, has agreed with Gazprom to undertake the rival South Stream project and 
OMV, Austria’s national energy company, has consented to transform the Baumgarten gas stor-
age and distribution hub into a joint venture with Gazprom (Socor 2008). Second, the project has 
also been stymied by Turkey’s opposition to the inclusion of Gas de France, whose home coun-
try has staunchly opposed Turkey’s EU accession, as a seventh member company of the pipeline 
construction  consortium, which recently added a German partner (Özerkan 2008). While the 
first problem seems to undermine EU energy security, the latter problem suggests that a lessen-
ing of resistance to Turkey’s EU membership could strengthen this security by bolstering An-
kara’s willingness to move ahead on Nabucco.  
 
Egypt, a new LNG exporter, may also wish to use Turkey (after Jordan and Syria in suc-
cession) to pipe its gas to Europe. Accordingly, Egypt, Jordan, Syria—where Gazprom’s partial-
ly owned construction company Stroitransgaz has built the Syrian leg, and Turkey agreed to ex-
tend a proposed Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) project up to Turkish territory, where additional con-
nections could link it to Nabucco (Winrow 2004, pp. 34-35).
14 EU members do not enjoy immun-
ity from attempts by its primary suppliers to influence flows of Middle East and African energy 
supplies to Europe. In addition to seeking to invest in Iran and participating in the AGP, Gaz-
prom has leveraged its home country’s Soviet-era alliances with the relevant regimes to enter 
North African energy sectors. In Libya, which exports gas to Italy via pipeline, Gazprom has ac-
quired gas and oil assets from a subsidiary of the German BASF firm that is party to a number of 
                                                 
12“Iran  Cuts  Gas  Supply  to  Turkey,”  Platts,  December  12,  2006,  available  via 
http://www.platts.com/Natural%20Gas/News/8781901.xml, accessed December 16, 2006; and ‘Factbox-
Turkmenistan’s  Natural  Gas  Projects’,  Reuters,  February  7,  2008,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008. 
13“Oil  and  Gas:  Iran,”  Economist  Intelligence  Unit-Business  Middle  East,  March  1,  2008,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008. 
14See  also  “Egypt-Export  Pipeline  Project,”  APS  Review  Gas  Market  Trends,  available  via 
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed  March 10, 2008.   10 
joint projects elsewhere, including “Nord Stream” (Socor 2006c).
15 However, Algeria, which sup-
plied 55 bcm (just under two-thirds of which came in the form of piped supplies to Italy and 
Spain), or 14 percent of Europe’s total 2006 gas imports (BP 2007: 30), is more salient in this re-
gard. In 2006, Gazprom agreed with Sonatrach, Algeria’s state energy firm, to produce gas and 
jointly market it to Europe in return for permitting the latter entity to help with an LNG develop-
ment in Russia (Socor 2007a). Gazprom has even begun exploring the possibility of producing 
Nigerian gas and delivering some of it via a proposed $10 billion trans-Saharan pipeline to Al-
geria and from there to Europe (Gray 2008). These efforts correlate with Russian and Algerian 
interests in coordinating official positions in the fifteen-member-state Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum (GECF), a collaboration that could impact 40 percent of Europe’s market. Yet, this gas car-
tel formation effort is presently hobbled by competition among pipeline-based suppliers (Cha-
zan 2007) and thus seems addressed, for Gazprom, to ensure its own security in the more global-
ized LNG market of the future. 
 
The Relative Cost Advantages of Turkish Energy Transport 
 
A further assumption underlying the claim that Turkey’s  EU  membership would aid 
European energy security holds that Turkish territory is a relatively cost-effective means of con-
veying energy resources from East to West (Tekin & Walterova 2007). As was mentioned earlier, 
while Turkey is not a globally essential oil corridor for the EU, its hosting of the U.S. $3.2 billion 
BTC crude oil pipeline, once regarded as prohibitively expensive prior to the 2003 Iraq War, may 
help not only to hold oil prices down at the margin, but also to allow Caspian crude in particular 
to compete with Russian and OPEC oil in Europe. Additional factors favoring landward Turkish 
oil transit is the fact that transporting Caspian oil by trans-Iranian pipelines to the Gulf, where 
countries can already load crude supplies produced in that region, and then by tanker, is less 
economically viable than exporting it via Turkey to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan crude blends are more conducive than many of the typically heavier and more 
sour grades of the Persian Gulf to European-area refineries regulated by stricter environmental 
directives.
16 
 
The building of pipelines is necessitated by the larger volume of Caspian crude oil that is 
coming on line. The economic prospects of trans-Turkey transit routes were certainly boosted by 
high energy prices, which finally eased in late 2008. The energy seller’s market was aggravated 
at the margins by a decrease in Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oilfield output due to increasingly stringent 
conditions that Russia had been seeking to impose on expansion of the CPC pipeline, thereby en-
ticing the multinational corporations extracting oil for export via that line to entertain the more 
expensive trans-Caspian route of export to Baku instead (Socor 2007b). Otherwise, the overall 
per-barrel costs of Caspian oil could not have gained much competitive advantage relative to 
Persian Gulf exports. However, growth in volumes of the latter may be restrained either by a 
potential onset of geophysical decline in the fields of major producer Saudi Arabia (Simmons 
2005) or by the unwillingness of major oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in 
stark contrast to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, to open and liberalize their upstream sectors (Mau-
                                                 
15See also “Libya Signs Oil Deal with Gazprom on Oil and Gas Production,” RIA Novosti, available via  
http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx, accessed March 10, 2008. 
16Terry Adams, “Caspian Hydrocarbons, the Politicization of Regional Pipelines, and the Destabilization 
of  the  Caucasus,”  2004,  available  via  http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/Vol5/adams.htm,  accessed  
March 10, 2008. As expressed in the EC’s 2003 Directive for the Promotion of Biofuels, the EU is endeavor-
ing to comply with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and other EC directives pertaining to fuel quality standards 
and energy taxation (Pahl 2004: 83-91).   11 
geri 2006). Conversely, technological innovation and infrastructure integration may help to hold 
down  the  costs  of  Caspian  extraction  and  attainment  of  long-term  regional  stability  should 
lower transporation costs. For some observers, Caspian crude extraction costs were expected to 
fall to U.S. $8 per barrel by 2010, which compares unfavorably to the per-barrel Gulf price of 
about U.S. $2, but is economically competitive at world prices over U.S. $15 (Adams 2004). These 
seemed likely to endure in the absence of any major demand contraction, as in Asia in 1997 and 
globally in 2009, or any lasting stabilization and liberalization of major source regions.
17 
 
In terms of gas, Central Asia, the Caspian and Iran are believed to hold enough gas to 
supply Europe through Turkey at reasonable costs. Consequently, developing conduits to ship 
this gas to Europe via Turkey could restrain the overall price that Gazprom can demand for its 
supplies (Gow 2008; Roberts 2004: 17-18).
18 The BTE or SCP line, the capacity of which BP initially 
set at 7-8 bcm but later thought capable of being expanded to accommodate 20 bcm, suggesting 
that much of the gas would be shipped onwards to Europe, was projected in early 2004 to cost 
almost U.S. $1 billion by the time of its expected completion (Roberts 2004: 6). Indeed, the SCP 
project played a key role in bolstering the viability of the BTC pipeline. Other than the overlap-
ping memberships of the ACG-BTC and Shah Deniz-BTE consortia and economies of scale asso-
ciated with building two pipelines along the same right-of-way, the Shah Deniz field’s estimated 
500 million barrels of oil condensate and additional possible crude reserves provided a poten-
tially valuable increment to the quantity and quality of oil that could be shipped through the BTC 
line (Cutler 2000; Roberts 2004: 6).  
 
Requiring upgrades and augmentations of its territorial pipeline infrastructure, Turkey 
needs more infusions of outside capital. Iran’s potential as an investor is hampered by sanctions 
and the need for outside investment to develop its own gas sector to the point where that coun-
try can serve as an actual source of gas for Europe (Roberts 2004: 11). As mentioned above, Gaz-
prom has made overtures to buy into Turkey’s gas distribution and storage network, but pri-
marily in order to establish a position from which to thwart the effective diversification of EU 
gas suppliers. Alternatively, as Transneft did in supporting the construction of the trans-Black 
Sea Bourgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, Gazprom has also sought to bypass Turkey via the 
similarly routed South Stream gas pipeline. 
 
The European Commission (2007a: 25) has underscored the EU’s interest in Nabucco by 
advocating the commingling of funds amassed under the auspices of its proposed Neighbor-
hood Investment Fund with those raised by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). These entities earlier agreed to cover 70 per-
cent of the cost of the project (Socor 2006b), calculated by U.S. officials to be capable of providing 
gas for as low as one-fifth the cost of South Stream (Gow 2008).
19 This would help to undergird 
development of a longer “trans-Caspian energy corridor” and pave the way for a transparent 
                                                 
17Terry Adams, “Caspian Hydrocarbons, the Politicization of Regional Pipelines, and the Destabilization 
of  the  Caucasus,”  2004,  available  via  http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/Vol5/adams.htm,  accessed  
March 10, 2008. 
18See also Steven R. Mann, “Remarks: Florence IEA Conference,” April 14, 2003, pp. 7-8, available via 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2003/caspian/Mann.pdf, accessed March 10, 2008 
19The share of an unspent €3.75 billion in EU money for electricity and gas interconnections that is to be 
spent on Nabucco was recently reduced from €250 to €200 million. “Ministers Give Nod to EU Energy Se-
curity  Agenda,”  EurActiv.com,  February  20,  2009,  available  via 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/ministers-give-nod-eu-energy-security-agenda/article-179638, 
accessed February 26, 2009.   12 
legal framework to promote investment in international energy projects by means of a European 
coordinator mechanism.   
 
European energy security and the Turkish accession process 
 
There has been a lively debate on the EU’s motive behind enlargement. While many have 
underscored the decisiveness of the moral and ethical logic behind the recent EU enlargement to 
Eastern Europe, others have emphasized the dominant role of geostrategic reasons (Moravcsik 
& Vachudova 2003; Sjursen 2002). However, there is a broader consensus on the EU motives for 
endorsing the Turkish candidacy and starting membership negotiations for Turkey (Öniş 2000; 
Tekin 2005). Forward movement of the Turkish process finds its strongest explanation in the ra-
tional calculations of the EU. In this respect, Turkey’s role in the security of energy supplies to 
Europe  figures  prominently  in  the  discussions.  Admittedly,  it  is  difficult  to  differentiate  the 
energy security aspect from the other geostrategic variables at work. Yet, it is possible to discern 
linkages between the energy security of Europe and the Turkish accession, as evidenced in state-
ments of the EU policymakers on the changing Turkish question. 
 
The EU policy between the 1997 Luxembourg and 1999 Helsinki EU Council Summits 
shifted  dramatically.  The  Helsinki  Summit  agenda  included,  besides  the  Turkish  candidacy, 
strong efforts to advance the EU’s geostrategic interests (Tekin 2005). Supporters of the Turkish 
cause have explicitly cited Turkey’s geostrategic advantages, including the energy security is-
sue, in the EU Council’s internal debates. Some initially Turkey-sceptic leaders were seemingly 
convinced by this line of argument. Carl Bildt and Massimo D’Alema, foreign ministers of Swe-
den and Italy, respectively, wrote in a joint article that “... Turkey is a key actor in the realm of 
energy security. Given the uncertain state of energy markets, and the stakes involved, it is our 
shared  interest  to  incorporate  Turkey  in  a  functioning  integrated  system”  (Bildt  &  D’Alema 
2004). 
 
This instrumentalist logic of Turkish accession is also prevalent in many reports. The re-
port by the Independent Commission on Turkey spelled it out quite clearly: “Turkey’s geopoliti-
cal position makes it a vital factor for Europe’s security of energy supplies” (Independent Com-
mission on Turkey 2004: 18). Another report by the World Economic Forum cited Turkey’s signi-
ficant role in mitigating the long-term impact of oil price shock and energy supply interruptions 
on Europe. The report asserts that “For Turkey to play this risk mitigating role, Turkey must be 
securely  anchored  in  European  energy  frameworks,  infrastructure  and  transit  agreements” 
(World Economic Forum 2006: 15).  
 
Yet, EU official positions remain disparate in terms of associating the Turkish accession 
process with European energy security. Olli Rehn, the Commissioner for Enlargement, recently 
stated that “the EU and Turkey share essential strategic interests, e.g., in security, economy and 
dialogue of civilizations. That is one of the reasons why the EU decided to open negotiations for 
membership with Turkey. . . . [Energy strategy] is an area where both the EU and Turkey can 
gain from deeper cooperation.”
20 On the other hand, the EU seems to hedge in line with the un-
certainties surrounding the eventual fate of the accession talks, as manifested in the statements 
of  Energy  Commissioner  Andris  Piebalgs.  He  depicts  the  EU-Turkish  energy  cooperation  as 
offering “mutual benefits for both sides” and expresses determination “to work together with 
Turkey to realize these mutual benefits.” He goes even further to state that “this is a process that 
                                                 
20Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU: Together for a European Energy Policy—High Level Conference 
in Istanbul on June 5, 2007, available via http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do   13 
… has nothing to do with the EU accession—the one does not prejudge the other or vice versa. ... 
they both stem from the understanding that further cooperation is needed between EU and Tur-
key in a number of fields.”
21  
 
While  EU  official  documents  use  guarded  language  in  linking  energy  security  issues 
with the Turkish accession process, recent documents prepared by the Commission seem to give 
more emphasis to the importance of Turkey in meeting EU energy policy objectives. The Acces-
sion Partnership Documents of 2001 and 2003 carefully specify the short- and medium-term ob-
jectives of preparing to adopt the energy acquis and complying with the electricity and gas direc-
tives (The European Council 2003, Annex: 23). The last Partnership Document also emphasizes 
completing the alignment of national legislation with the acquis as well as promoting the imple-
mentation  in  Turkey  of  “projects  of  common  interest”  in  the  European  Community  Trans-
European Networks-Energy Guidelines (The European Council 2005, Annex: 13 and 18).  
 
Among the official EU documents, the 2004 Turkish Progress Report contains a detailed 
analysis of energy issues. It suggests that:  
 
Turkey is strengthening its position as an energy transit country, including 
through the development of projects of common interest. It is increasing its role as 
transit country for gas from Russia, the Caspian sea region and the Middle East, 
including through the development of the Nabucco gas pipeline.... Turkey is en-
couraged  to  continue  its  efforts  to  improve  its  gas  ...  interconnections  ...  to 
strengthen the security of supply and also the future Energy Community in South 
East Europe. Following the increasing awareness in the EU on the need to protect 
energy infrastructures from malicious acts, Turkey will be expected to actively 
participate in all initiatives that the EU may take in view of a stronger security in 
the energy sector (European Commission 2004: 115).  
 
The Report concludes that “Turkey will play a pivotal role in diversifying resources and 
routes for oil and gas transit from neighbouring countries to the EU” (European Commission 
2004: 116). 
 
The most recent Progress Reports (2006 and 2007) mention that “Turkey has not signed 
the  Energy  Community  Treaty  establishing  a  regional  energy  market  in  southeast  Europe” 
(European Commission 2006b & 2007b: 49 for both). What seems to receive more emphasis in 
those reports is the Trans-European Networks (TENs). The Reports state that “under the energy 
networks programme, the Community supports transmission infrastructure feasibility projects 
to increase competitiveness in the EU electricity and gas markets while reinforcing security of 
supply.... The Nabucco natural gas pipeline project from the Caspian and Central Asian region 
to Europe via Turkey is among the priority projects of the EU, and Turkey should pursue efforts 
to support this project” (European Commission 2006b: 49; European Commission 2007b: 55).  
 
The Screening Reports on the energy and TENs acquis chapters provide details of the de-
velopments within and future expectations from Turkey on energy security. The trans-European 
energy  guidelines  of  2006  identify  axes  of  priority  projects  and  projects  of  common  interest 
(European Commission 2006b). Building upon these guidelines, the screening report on Trans-
                                                 
21Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, EU and Turkey: Together for a European Energy Policy, Speech 
delivered  at  the  conference  “Turkey  and  the  EU,”  Istanbul,  June  5,  2007,  available  via 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do, accessed 10 March 2008.   14 
European networks points out that “TEN-[Energy] respond to the growing importance for se-
curing and diversifying the Community’s energy supplies, incorporating the energy networks of 
the Member States and candidate countries, and ensuring the coordinated operation of the en-
ergy networks in the Community and in neighbouring countries” (European Commission 2007b: 
2). The Turkish side has expressed that it can accept the acquis regarding the trans-European net-
works of energy by the time of accession (2). The report asserts that Turkey, “located in the vi-
cinity of world’s greatest energy reserves,” is a “natural connector” between the producer coun-
tries and European energy markets (4). The on-going gas pipeline projects, connecting Turkey-
Greece-Italy and Turkey-Austria (Nabucco), are both considered as “TEN-E priority projects.” 
Turkey also suggests that other projects, such as Arab Gas Pipeline-Turkey Interconnector, as 
well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Iraq-Turkey, and Trans-Caspian pipelines, should be consid-
ered as EU priority projects as they can supply gas and connect to Mediterranean networks (5). 
The report assesses that “overall, Turkey has reached a satisfactory level of preparedness re-
garding the strategic development of the ... energy networks in accordance with the design and 
objectives of the ... TEN-E” (5). Turkey has ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, and the develop-
ment  of  energy  networks  in  Turkey  is  a  “significant  step  in  ensuring  the  transit  of  energy 
resources and increase security of supply in Europe” (6).    
  
In June 2007, a high-level Istanbul conference dealt with the common challenges and op-
portunities for the EU and Turkey in the energy field. The joint statement of Turkish and Com-
mission leaders called the conference “a milestone in their strategic cooperation in the field of 
energy.” The statement emphasized the importance of strategic cooperation and the exploitation 
of Turkey’s geographic location in providing energy security for Europe. Existing and future 
projects were discussed, the urgency of taking joint initiatives emphasized, and the strong com-
mitments of both Turkey and the European Commission put forward. Firm commitment was 
extended for Nabucco and other projects with the goal of exploiting Turkey’s potential to be-
come a major energy player.
22  
 
The conference was also significant in that it clearly linked Turkey’s role in European en-
ergy security with its accession process. After affirming Turkey’s strategic importance for the 
security of energy supplies to the EU, the joint statement declared that “as Turkey is moving for-
ward in the accession process, coherent policies will need to be implemented with a view to en-
suring secure access to the energy resources of the region and their safe arrival to the markets.” 
The statement also encouraged Turkey to join the Energy Community as quickly as possible, “as 
an equal party in the decision making process.”
23      
     
Attitudes on both sides are quite telling. The EU strongly and explicitly encourages Tur-
key to join the Southern European Energy Community while the Turkish government seems to 
be more reserved. Another example is the Turkish objection to the participation of the Gas de 
France in the Nabucco project, based on the disapproval of the French opposition to Turkish ac-
cession. In a recent visit to Romania, French President Sarkozy allegedly asked his Romanian 
counterpart to put pressure on Turkey for Gas de France to be included in the project.
24 This 
comes in contrast to recent Greco-Turkish rapprochement on the issue of energy. At the inaugu-
ration ceremony of the first leg of Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector on November 17, 2007, 
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in Istanbul on 5 June 2007, available via http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do 
23Joint Press Release, Turkey and the EU: Together for a European Energy Policy—High Level Conference 
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24 See http://www.abhaber.com, accessed March 6, 2008.   15 
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis stated that, “All Greeks want good neighbourly relations with 
Turkey ... and strongly support Turkey’s course toward Europe.”
25   
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion makes amply clear that the EU cannot easily diversify its ener-
gy suppliers. Currently, the EU largely depends on three main supply regions, two of which, the 
FSU (i.e., Russian and Russian-controlled exports from the Central Asian states of the Caspian 
Basin) and North Africa, are external to the EEA. The key to diversification, especially in the criti-
cal area of gas, seems to be increasing imports from a wider range of suppliers in the Middle 
East (e.g., including Egypt, Iran and Iraq) as well as developing independent access to energy 
supplies from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This would enlarge the volume of 
Caspian supplies beyond those from Azerbaijan that currently reach Europe without crossing 
Russian territory. 
 
In terms of the latter challenge, a Turkish energy corridor seems to offer one of the only 
feasible modes of connecting a greater diversity of suppliers to Europe along a larger number of 
secure and independent routes. However, as shown above, treating Turkey’s capacity and will-
ingness to serve as a transit country, primarily for gas, as a matter to be addressed within exist-
ing frameworks of cooperation may not be enough to ensure Europe’s energy security. The pro-
posed  energy  networks,  associated  with  such  mammoth  infrastructural  undertakings  as  the 
Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector or the Nabucco Pipeline, which have been prioritized by the 
Commission,  involve  the  higher  standardization  and  integration  of  regulatory  environments 
characteristic of political union. Thus, more serious efforts by the EU on supplier diversification 
and the securing of those supplies may require less ambivalence on Turkey’s accession.     
 
Conversely, if the EU distances itself further from Turkey, as indicated by partial suspen-
sion of membership talks in late 2006, its energy security may face a number of potentially nega-
tive long-term consequences. For instance, if the Turkish accession process grinds to a halt, it 
would  not  be  hard  to  imagine  Turkish  foreign  policy  becoming  more  pro-Russian.  The  two 
might indeed form an “axis of the excluded” (Hill & Taspinar 2006), a result of feeling like “out-
casts from the European mainstream” (Barysch & Grant 2006: 28). Another concern focuses on 
the credibility of the EU within the Muslim world, with which the Commission seeks better rela-
tions as part of the EU’s overall energy diplomacy (European Commission 2001: 73). Failure of 
the accession talks would damage the ability of the EU to influence the Muslim Middle East. 
This contrasts with calls for special emphasis to be placed on “dialogue in parts of the world 
which are of particular importance to the Union’s energy supply, in which the Union has a ma-
jor economic presence and in which it should also have a major political presence, as is the case 
with the Middle East” (Committee on Foreign Relations 2001).  
 
As  manifest  in  the  elevated  and  more  concerted  policy  and  financial  attention  being 
dedicated  to  the  Turkey-Greece-Italy  Interconnector  and  the  Nabucco  pipeline,  a  significant 
number of EU members no longer appear to entertain the belief that they can gain their desired 
levels of energy security without involving Turkey more integrally in Union plans, programs 
and directives. In short, the concept of Turkey’s belonging in the premier league of European 
states may gain firmer traction as EU countries seek to exert greater regulatory influence over 
the development and usage of increasingly critical Turkish energy pipelines. 
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